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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JJBAKDf a U t a h G e n e r a l P a r t n e r s h i p , 
Tl a i ml i I 1 mi in I  i1" |i i| in I 1 I i , 
v s . 
HOWARD F. HATCH, 
De f e n d a n t a n d A p p e 1 1 a n t . 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
i i i Il I  1 1 1 0 <i 1 • I A 
T r i a l Court No. 920-2 33 0 CV 
JURISDICTION 
The I Jtah C : I n : t • : f A ppea ] s 1 las ji n : :! 3d :ii c .ti :: i i :: •:!: tl: :n :! s case 
pursuant I : > Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2A-3 (2) (d) < if Utah 
Judicial Code. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. on or about July 22, 1992, 
Appellee filed a :oi" : I t ; i :ii tl: I the Ti hill r III t Im I In pur pi ISIJ» up 
evicting the Appelle ^nd his mob Lie huiiii. n R, , ij i Appellant's 
mobi .*. noire was occupying one of i.he lots in Appellee's mobile home 
p i : • M o b i 1 p I I n in i1 III1 n i h " i if \ t n l i 11 I i i 
Utah County, Utah. The grounds for the lawsuit Included the fact 
that Appellant had been served a fifteen-day rule violation notice 
o * " hereafter served .,i t'hroe-
day lease termination notice for repeated failure t.o comply '* it.li 
mob: . home park rules on or about July "he basis for the 
f j f* y in III I mi r I I  a / t iii o i l n o t i c e * w n i . 1 had fan led t o 
provide LI'it' care of the lawns and landscaping around the 
subject leased premises thus creating a health and f:i re hazard, was 
maintaining unapproved storage sheds and enclosures on the premises 
and was storing miscellaneous items around the premises not in 
proper storage, failed to provide proper skirting and coverage over 
the mobile home hitch/tongue and mobile home; and was maintaining 
an unlicensed vehicle in the park, all of which were violations of 
specific rules by which the Appellant was obligated to abide. The 
three-day lease termination notice for repeated failure to comply 
was served on Appellant for the identical violations set forth in 
the fifteen-day notice. Appellant also owed rent for July, 1992 in 
the amount of $170.00 which was the fair market value of the leased 
premises. Appellee, therefore, sought judgment against the 
Appellant for termination of the lease and immediate restitution 
and possession of the leased premises, unpaid rent for July, 1992 
and rent at the rate of $5.48 per day until judgment was entered 
and restitution was granted and for costs and attorney's fees as 
provided for in the lease agreement. 
On or about August 24, 1992, Appellant filed an answer 
and counterclaim. (R. 31) Appellant raised as a defense that he 
signed the lease agreement with the Appellee under duress. 
Appellant raised as an affirmative defense that he was never 
subject to the provisions of the lease agreement or the rules. 
Appellant in his counterclaim alleged that the rules and 
regulations of the park were unreasonable and unduly burdensome and 
without proper legal basis. He further alleged in the counterclaim 
that these rules were null and void as to him and his mobile home 
located in the park. Accordingly, Appellant alleged that he was 
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entitled to special damages and punitive damages for being required 
to live by the park rules. 
B. Course of Proceedings. On August 31, 1992, after 
Appellant's answer was filed, Appellee filed a certificate of 
readiness for trial and request for trial setting.(R. 37) On 
September 1, 1992, the Court ordered that the matter be set for 
pre-trial conference. (R. 38) On September 11, 1992, Appellee 
filed a motion for the Court for a landlord's possession bond. (R. 
44) The grounds for the motion was that Appellant had not paid 
rent for July, August, and September, 1992, and was currently in 
default of said rental payments. On September 14, 1992, the Court 
ordered that Appellee file a possession bond in the form of a cash 
bond in the amount of $5,000.00 (R. 45), and a notice of the 
possession bond was served on Appellant. (R. 102) Appellant 
demanded a hearing as provided for in the Forcible Entry and 
Detainer Act, Utah Code Annotated Section 78-36-8.5(2) (R. 54), and 
the hearing was held on September 22, 1992 at the hour of 11:00 
a.m. (R. 57) (For full citation of the Forcible Entry and Detainer 
Act, see Addendum "GM.) Appellee was represented by its counsel, 
James R. Boud, and Appellant appeared personally at the hearing. 
Arguments were heard by Appellee and Appellant and the Court 
ordered specifically that Appellant could retain possession of the 
premises upon posting a counter-bond in the form of cash or a 
cashier's check in the amount of $3,500.00. The Court indicated 
the necessity of the bond due to the reason that a counterclaim had 
been filed, and a jury trial had been demanded by Appellant, both 
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of which could be lengthy and affected Appellant's right to an 
expedient trial and could result in substantial fees and costs to 
Appellant. At said hearing Appellant acknowledged not having paid 
rent for July, August, and September and was therefore ordered by 
the Court to pay those rents into the Court as required by Utah 
Code Annotated Section 57-16-8. (See Order; Addendum "A".) The 
bond and the rents were to be paid by Appellant into Court by 
Friday, September 25, 1992, at 5:00 p.m. The Court ruled that if 
Appellant did not pay the rent into the Court, then Appellee could 
proceed with a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated Section 57-16-8. Similarly, if the bond was not posted 
timely, Appellee would be entitled to a writ of restitution 
immediately thereafter. (See Order; Addendum "A".) 
On or about October 1, 1992, Appellant filed a motion to 
disqualify Judge Sumsion, the assigned judge to the case who had 
ruled on the September 22, 1992 hearing. The basis for Appellant's 
motion was that Judge Sumsion had been an attorney in the firm of 
Sumsion & Park with whom " . . . this defendant has had a long and 
bitter legal battle . . . " and also on the grounds that Judge 
Sumsion had made a statement at the September 22, 1992 hearing that 
the case would not be a simple one. Accordingly, Judge Sumsion 
entered a minute entry on October 6, 1992, recusing himself from 
the case. (See Addendum MB,f.) On October 9, 1992, Judge Sumsion 
entered a ruling on the motion stating he was recusing himself 
because he would soon be retiring and the case may not reach final 
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disposition before his retirement date in two months. (See Addendum 
"C".) 
Appellant posted the bond timely as ordered by the Court 
(R. 58) but failed to pay rent as ordered by the Court. 
Accordingly, on October 15, 1992, Appellee filed a motion for 
summary judgment. (R. 73) The basis for this motion was in two 
parts. First, Appellant had acknowledged owing rents for July, 
August, and September, 1992, and that said rents had not been paid. 
The Court had ordered in the prior hearing of September 22, 1992, 
that the rents must be paid and that Appellee could proceed with a 
motion for summary judgment if they were not paid into Court. 
Second, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 57-16-8, if a 
resident of a mobile home park elects to contest an eviction 
proceeding, all rents, fees, and service charges due and incurred 
during the pending action shall be paid into the Court. Failure to 
do so constitutes grounds for granting summary judgment in favor of 
the mobile home park. The Court entered the order granting summary 
judgment on October 19, 1992. (See Order; Addendum "D".) 
On October 20, 1992, Appellant filed his memorandum in 
opposition to motion for summary judgment claiming that payment of 
rent was discretionary despite what the Court's earlier order had 
been. (R. 90) Appellant requested an oral argument. On or about 
November 3, 1992, Appellant filed his motion and memorandum to set 
aside order. (R. 94) The Court, therefore, scheduled a hearing 
which was held on November 18, 1992, allowing oral argument on 
Appellee's motion for summary judgment and on Appellant's motion to 
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set aside the order. (R. 103 and 104) At the hearing the Court 
heard arguments by both parties and ruled that summary judgment was 
proper for the Appellee under Utah Code Annotated Section 57-16-8 
and pursuant to Appellant's failure to abide by the September 22, 
1992 order. (R. 116) The Court found that summary judgment being 
entered, Appellant's counterclaim was moot and therefore dismissed 
the same. Appellant then filed this appeal. 
C. Disposition at Trial Court. Summary judgment was 
granted in favor of the Appellee on November 18, 1992. With the 
filing of the summary judgment the Court found the Appellant's 
counterclaim moot and dismissed the same. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There were no improprieties or prejudices by the Trial 
Court judges in this case as argued by Appellant. The initial 
judge, Judge Sumsion, recused himself upon motion by the Appellant 
because he was soon to be retiring and believed the case would not 
be disposed of in its finality before his retirement date. (See 
minute entry and see ruling at Addendums "B" and "C", 
respectively.) This is certainly not grounds evidencing any 
prejudice by the Judge. In any event, the Judge granted 
Appellant's motion to recuse leaving nothing Appellant can point to 
in the record that would cause the new judge to have any presumed 
bias against the Appellant. Furthermore, there is nothing on the 
record that Appellant can identify that would show that Judge 
McGuire was prejudiced or violated any statutes or otherwise acted 
6 
with impropriety towards the Appellant. (See minute entry by Judge 
McGuire at Addendum "E".) 
Summary judgment was proper in this matter based upon 
applicable Utah statutes giving the Court authority to grant 
summary judgment in favor of the landlord where the tenant, in an 
eviction action, elects to contest the action and fails to pay 
rent. Based on this statute alone, the Court had every right to 
grant Appellee's summary judgment when the Appellant on his own 
admission failed to pay rent into the Court for five months 
following the initiation of the lawsuit. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellee sees no reason to respond to Appellantfs 
argument regarding Judge Sumsion's prejudice. Although Appellee 
disagrees there was any prejudice by Judge Sumsion, the Judge did, 
in fact, recuse himself without making any rulings relative to this 
appeal. Accordingly, the alleged issue concerning Judge Sumsion's 
supposed prejudice against Appellant was resolved upon recusing 
himself. Also, there is nothing on the record showing any 
prejudice by Judge McGuire. In fact, he made it very clear that he 
did not know Mr. Hatch and had not talked about the case with any 
of the other judges. (See Addendum "E".) 
Appellee, in review of the record, can find nothing that 
would show that Judge McGuire violated any rules and regulations of 
the Court by entering a summary judgment as argued by Appellant. 
Although it appears from the record that the Court may have 
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inadvertently entered a ruling for judgment in favor of Appellee 
prior to the expiration of ten days time for a response, as 
required by Rule 4-501(2), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, 
the Court corrected that error by allowing Appellant oral argument 
and an opportunity to file a responsive pleading. Appellant did 
file a written response setting forth his arguments and was granted 
a hearing. Oral argument was made before the Court on November 18, 
1992, and Appellant had full opportunity to argue his objections. 
Following argument, the Court ruled that summary judgment was 
proper, not only because Appellant failed to pay rent as ordered 
earlier, but also pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 57-16-8, 
which reads as follows: 
If a resident elects to contest an eviction proceeding, 
all rents, fees, and service charges due and incurred 
during the pendency of the action shall be paid into the 
court according to the current mobile home park payment 
schedule. Failure of the resident to pay such amounts, 
in the discretion of the court, may constitute grounds 
for granting summary judgment in favor of the mobile home 
park. Upon final termination of the issues between the 
parties, the court shall order all amounts paid into 
court paid to the mobile home park. The prevailing party 
is also entitled to court costs and reasonable attorney's 
fees. 
The Court ordered that pursuant to the above section, Appellee was 
entitled to summary judgment, which included restitution of the 
mobile home park premises, rent due and owing, and reasonable 
attorney's fees. Appellant clearly was in violation of the statute 
and the Court had every right to exercise its discretion to grant 
summary judgment in favor of the Appellee. The Judge very clearly 
stated in a minute entry of November 9, 1992, that he had not 
discussed the case with the previous judge who had recused himself, 
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Judge Sumsion, that he had no idea who the Appellant was nor the 
Appellee or its attorneys or agents, and that he had no personal 
interest in this matter except to exercise justice, (See Addendum 
lfEM.) There is simply nothing in the record that would indicate 
that Judge McGuire was prejudiced and did anything other than 
follow the applicable statutory provisions. Because the issues 
raised in Appellant's counterclaim were moot in light of the ruling 
for summary judgment, the Court dismissed the counterclaim which 
was within the Court's discretion. 
As an additional matter, Appellant has filed an affidavit 
of impecuniosity claiming poverty and inability to bear the 
expenses of appeal. Appellant, however, had no difficulty posting 
a $3,500.00 bond within three days when so ordered by the Trial 
Court. Further, Appellant represented that he owned the subject 
mobile home free and clear of any liens. Appellee, therefore, 
believes Appellant has the ability to bear his costs of appeal and 
has not come before this Court with clean hands by stating 
otherwise. (See Addendum "H".) 
CONCLUSION 
Appellee respectfully requests the Court to deny 
Appellant's request to have the case remanded to the lower court 
and accordingly to uphold the summary judgment granted herein. 
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DATED this '9 day of 1993. 
ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN 
& BOUD, P.C. 
BY. l/l^^—L 
Jamefeyft. Boud 
Attorney for Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Appellee's Brief was mailed postage prepaid on the 
/t> day of May, 1993, to the following: 
Howard Hatch 
843 South 1150 East 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 
^Pv(r 
06-97-bn 
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James R. Boud, USB #A0388 
ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN & BOUD, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
302 West 5400 South, Suite 103 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-0300 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JJBAKD, a Utah General 
Partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HOWARD HATCH, 
Defendant. 
i ORDER 
i Civil No. 920-2330 CV 
On Tuesday, September 22, 1992, at the hour of 11:00 a.m. 
a hearing was held on Plaintifffs notice of possession bond which 
had been served upon the Defendant, Howard Hatch. James R. Boud 
appeared on behalf of Plaintiff along with representatives of the 
Plaintiff. Howard Hatch appeared personally and personally 
requested the hearing. After hearing the arguments of counsel, 
James R. Boud, and Defendant, Howard Hatch, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The Court requires the Defendant, Howard Hatch, if 
he is to retain possession of the premises, to post a counter-bond 
in the form of cash or cashier's check in the amount of $3,500.00. 
The Court acknowledges that this bond would have been lower had the 
Defendant not requested a jury trial in the above matter and filed 
ADDENDUM "A" 
a counterclaim. However, it clearly appears to the Court that with 
the complications in the case, and the requested jury trial, that 
$3,500.00 is a minimum bond for the Defendant to post in order to 
protect Plaintiff for attorney fees and costs that will be expended 
in the prosecution and trial of this case. The court acknowledges 
that Plaintiff has shown its good faith by posting a $5,000.00 
cashier's check with the Court in order to protect the Defendant 
should Defendant: prevail. 
2. the $3,500.00 bond shall be posted by Friday, 
September 25, 1992, at 5:00 p.m. If said bond is not posted, then 
the Clerk of th^ court shall issue a writ of restitution in favor 
of the Plaintiff. it was acknowledged at the hearing that rents 
for July, August, and September have not been paid. If Defendant 
does not pay the.se rents into the Court, then Plaintiff shall have 
a right to make the rent an issue in this case and proceed with a 
summary judgment motion against the Defendant as authorized by Utah 
Code Annotated Section 57-16-8. 
DATED this day of September, 1992. 
~ U 
JUDGE JOHN "BACKLUND 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order was mailed postage prepaid on the £. ^ day of 
September, 1992, to the following: 
Howard Hatch 
843 South 1150 East 
Pleasant Grove, UT 8406 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
JJBAKD ) 
Plaintiff, ) MINUTE ENTRY 
vs ) 
) Dated: October 6, 1992 
Howard F. Hatch ) 
) Case No. 920002330CV 
Defendant. ) 
) JUDGE Robert J. Sumsion 
MINUTE ENTRY 
The Court is in receipt of Defendant's Motion to Disqualify 
and Affidavit of Prejudice. After considering the motion, Judge 
Robert J. Sumsion, Circuit Court Judge, hereby recuses himself 
from this case. 
I certify that copies of the foregoing minute entry were mailed, 
postage prepaid, on this 7th day of October, 1992, to the 
following interested parties: 
James R. Boud, 302 W 5400 S, Suite 103, Murray, UT 84107 
Howard F. Hatch, 843 S 1150 E, Pleasant Grove, UT 84062 
Jerry Clipp 
Deputy Court Clerk 
ADDENDUM "B" 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
JJBAKD, a Utah General 
Partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
HOWARD HATCH, 
Defendant, 
R U L I N G 
CASE# 920002330 CV 
I have recused myself for the additional reason that this case may 
never get before the Court for final disposition prior to my 
retirement date of December 15, 1992. It would seem advisable 
that it be assigned a judge who can take it to its final 
disposition. I thought we had sufficient time, but Mr. Hatch has 
convinced me otherwise. 
DATED: October 9, 1992 
Circuit Courfr^Juage 
I do hereby certify that copies of the foregoing RULING were 
mailed, postage prepaid, on this 14th day of October, 1992 to the 
following parties. 
James R. Boud, 302 West 5400 South, Suite 103, Murray, Utah 84107 
Howard F Hatch, 843 South 1150 East, Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Davi Coombs 
Circuit Court Clerk 
ADDENDUM "C" 
James R. Boud, USB #A0388 
Bradley R. Jones, USB #A4747 
ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN & BOUD, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
302 West 5400 South, Suite 103 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 263-0300 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JJBAKD, a Utah General ] 
Partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HOWARD F. HATCH, 
Defendant. ] 
f ORDER 
i Civil No. 920-2330 CV 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment having come 
before the above-entitled Court, based upon the pleadings and for 
good cause showing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff 
shall have Judgment against the Defendant for $680.00 rent; $881.25 
attorneys fees for a total of $1,561.25. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Plaintiff is entitled to restitution of the premises described as 
920 South 340 West, Provo, Utah and that the lease agreement 
between the parties is hereby terminated. The Clerk of the Court 
1 
ADDENDUM "D" 
is hereby authorized to issue a Writ of Restitution on behalf of 
Plaintiff for the purpose of restoring the premises to Plaintiff. 
DATED this day of October, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
Circuit Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order was mailed postage prepaid on the I *-» day of 
October, 1992, to the following: 
Howard F. Hatch 
843 South 1150 East 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN 
& BOUD, P.C. 
s^r 
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FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
JJBAKED, a Utah General 
Partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
HOWARD HATCH, 
Defendant. 
Minute Entry 
CASE# 920002330 CV 
The assignment of this case was pursuant to the procedure set up 
by the Utah Law, that is by the presiding Judge of the Circuit who 
is Judge Sumsion. 
I have not discussed this case with Judge Sumsion or any other 
person and am at this time making it very clear to the parties and 
their attorneys that I will accept no phone calls on this case, no 
personal contacts and no further letters directed personally to me 
and not the file. 
Mr. Hatch, I would not know you if you walked through the door, 
which of course, based on the above you will not do. I know none 
of the parties and have absolutely no desire to know any of the 
parties. I have only briefly reviewed the file for purposes of 
ruling on a motion. At this moment I could not tell you the 
averments of plaintiffs' complaint and who is plaintiff and who is 
defendant in the case. 
I am a hands on Judge and will play an active part in moving this 
case, as I do all my civil cases, through the Court system in 
hopefully an efficient and timely way. 
The facts of the case and applicable law is all that interests me 
in this civil case as all others. 
DATED: November 9, 1992 
/ 
<J 
./,'• L 
Circuit Court Judge 
ADDENDUM "E" 
I do hereby certify that copies of the foregoing Minute Entry 
were mailed, postage prepaid, on this 10th day of November, 1992 
to the following parties• 
Howard F. Hatch, 843 South 1150 East, Pleasant Grove, UT 84062 
James R. Boud, 302 West 5400 South, Suite 103, Murray, UT 84107 
Davi Coombs 
Circuit Court Clerk 
CHAPTER 16 
MOBILE HOME PARK RESIDENCY 
57-16-2. Purpose of chapter. 
The fundamental right to own and protect land and to establish conditions 
for its use by others necessitate that the owner of a mobile home park be 
provided with speedy and adequate remedies against those who abuse the 
terms of a tenancy The high cost of moving mobile homes, the requirements 
of mobile home parks relating to their installation, and the cost of land.scaping 
and lot preparation necessitate that the owners of mobile homes occupied 
within mobile home parks be provided with protection from actual or con-
structive eviction. It is the purpose of this chapter to provide protection for 
both the owners of mobile homes located in mobile home parks and for the 
owners of mobile home parks. 
57-16-3. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Mobile home" means a transportable structure in one or more sec-
tions with the plumbing, heating, and electrical systems contained within 
the unit, which when erected on a site, may be used with or without a 
permanent foundation as a family dwelling. 
(2) "Mobile home park" means any tract of land on which two or more 
mobile home spaces leased, or offered for lease or rent, to accommodate 
mobile homes for residential purposes. 
(3) "Resident" means an individual who leases or rents space in a mo-
bile home park. 
(4) "Mobile home space" means a specific area of land within a mobile 
home park designed to accommodate one mobile home. 
(5) "Rent" means charges paid for the privilege of occupying a mobile 
home space, and may include service charges and fees. 
(6) "Service charges" means separate charges paid for the use of electri-
cal and gas service improvements which exist at a mobile home space, or 
for trash removal, sewage and water, or any combination of the above. 
(7) "Fees" means other charges incidental to a resident's tenancy in-
cluding, but not limited to, late fees, charges for pets, charges for storage 
of recreational vehicles, charges for the use of park facilities, and security 
deposits. 
(8) "Change of use" means a change of the use of a mobile home park, 
or any part of it, for a purpose other than the rental of mobile home 
spaces. 
57-16-4. Termination of lease by park owner — Require-
ment for lease agreement. 
(1) A mobile home park or its agents may not terminate a lease or rental 
agreement upon any ground other than as specified in this chapter. 
(2) Each agreement for the lease of mobile home space shall be written and 
signed by the parties. Each lease shall contain at least the following informa-
tion: 
(a) the name and address of the mobile home park owner and any 
persons authorized to act for the owner, upon whom notice and service of 
process may be served; 
(b) the type of the leasehold, and whether it be term or periodic; 
ADDENDUM "F" 
(c) a full disclosure of all rent, service charges, and other fees presently 
being charged on a periodic basis: 
(d) the date or dates on which the payment of rent, fees, and service 
charges are due; and 
(e) all rules that pertain to the mobile home park which, if broken, may 
constitute grounds for eviction. 
(3) Increases in rent or fees for periodic tenancies shall be unenforceable 
until 60 days after notice of the increase is mailed to the resident. If service 
charges are not included in the rent, service charges may be increased during 
the leasehold period after notice to the resident is given, and increases or 
decreases in electricity rates shall be passed through to the resident. Increases 
or decreases in the total cost of other service charges shall be passed through 
to the resident. 
The mobile home park may not alter the date or dates on which rent, fees, 
and service charges are due unless a 60-day written notice precedes the alter-
ation. 
(4) Any rule or condition of a lease purporting to prevent or unreasonably 
limit the sale of a mobile home belonging to a resident is void and unenforce-
able. The mobile home park may, however, reserve the right to approve the 
prospective purchaser of a mobile home who intends to become a resident, but 
such approval may not be unreasonably withheld. The mobile home park may 
require proof of ownership as a condition of approval. The mobile home park 
may unconditionally refuse to approve any purchaser of a mobile home who 
does not register prior to purchase. 
(5) A mobile home park may not restrict a resident's right to advertise for 
sale or sell his mobile home. However, the park may limit the size of a "for 
sale" sign affixed to the mobile home to not more than 144 square inches. 
(6) A mobile home park may not compel a resident who desires to sell his 
mobile home, either directly or indirectly, to sell it through an agent desig-
nated by the mobile home park. 
(7) In order to upgrade the quality of a mobile home park, it may require 
that a mobile home be removed from the park upon sale if: 
(a) the mobile home does not meet minimum size specifications: or 
(b) the mobile home is in rundown condition or in disrepair. 
57-16-5. Grounds for terminating lease. 
An agreement for the lease of mobile home space in a mobile home park 
may be terminated during its term by mutual agreement or for any one or 
more of the following causes: 
(1) Failure of a resident to comply with a mobile home park rule for a 
period of 15 days after receipt of notice of noncompliance from the mobile 
home park; 
(2) Repeated failure of a resident to abide by a mobile home park rule, 
if the original notice of noncompliance states that another violation of the 
same or a different rule might result in forfeiture without any further 
period of cure; 
(3) Behavior by a resident which substantially endangers the security 
and health of the other residents or threatens the property in the park; 
(4) Nonpayment of rent, fees, or service charges: 
(5) A change in the land use or condemnation of the mobile home park 
or any part of it. 
A legal action to terminate a lease based upon a caus^ --et tcnn in Secnon 
57-16-5 may '^vT t>e commenced except in accordance wi*- -*P allowing p-oce 
dure: 
»P Beiore issuance of any summons and complaint, the mobile home 
: • i rk -shall send or serve WTItten notice to the resident or subtenant: 
a) by delivering a copy of the notice personally; 
(b) by sending a copy of the notice through registered or certified 
mail addressed to the resident or subtenant at his place of residence; 
(c) if the resident or subtenant is absent from his place of resi-
dence, by leaving a copy of the notice with some person of suitable 
age and discretion at his residence and sending a copy through the 
mail addressed to the resident or suhtenant at his place of residence:; 
or 
I'd) If a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found, by 
affixing a copy of the notice in a conspicuous place on the residents or 
subtenant's mobile home and also sending a copy through the mail 
addressed to the resident or subtenant at his place of residence. 
(2) The notice shall set forth the cause for the notice and, if the cause is 
one which can be cured, the time within which the resident has to cure. 
The notice shall also set forth the time after which the mobile home park 
may commence legal action against the resident ifcure is not effected, as 
follows: 
(a) In the event of failure to abide by a mobile home park rule, the 
notice shall provide for a 15-day cure period except in the case of 
repeated violations and, shall state that if a cure is not timely ef-
fected, or a written agreement made between the mobile home park 
and the resident allowing for a variation in the rule or cure period, 
eviction proceedings may be initiated immediately. 
(b) If the resident commits repeated violations of a rule, a sum-
mons and complaint may be issued three days after a notice is served. 
(c) If a resident behaves in a manner that substantially endangers 
the well-being or property of other residents, eviction proceedings 
may commence immediately. 
(d> If a resident does not pay rent, fees, or service charges, tl le 
notice shall provide a three-day cure period and, that if cure is not 
timely effected, or a written agreement made between the mobile 
home park and the resident allowing for a variation in the rule or 
cure period, eviction proceedings may be initiated immediately. 
(el If there is a planned change in land use or condemnation of the 
park, the notice shall provide that the resident has 90 days after 
receipt of the notice to vacate the mobile home park if no governmen-
tal approval or permits incident to the planned change are required, 
and if governmental approval and permits are required, that the 
resident has 90 days to vacate the mobile home park after all permits 
or approvals incident to the planned change are obtained. 
'•*'> If the planned change in land use or condemnation requires the 
oval of a governmental agency, the mobile home park, in addition to 
equired by Subsection (2)(e), shall send written notice of the 
the initial hearing to each resident at least seven days before 
the date scheduled for the initial hearing. 
(4) Regardless of whether the change of use requires the approval of 
any governmental agency, if the resident was not a resident of the mobile 
home park at the time the initial change of use notice was issued to 
residents the owner shall give notice of the change of use to the resident 
before he occupies the mobile home space 
(5) Eviction proceedings commenced under this chapter and based on 
causes set forth in Subsections 57-16-5(1), (2). and i5> shall be brought in 
accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and shall not be 
treated as unlawful detainer actions under Chapter 36, Title 78. Eviction 
proceedings commenced under this chapter and based on causes of action 
set forth in Subsections 57-16-5(3) and (4) may, at the election of the 
mobile home park, be treated as actions brought under this chapter and 
the unlawful detainer provisions of Chapter 36, Title 78. except, if unlaw-
ful detainer is charged, the court shall endorse on the summons the num-
ber of days within which the defendant is required to appear and defend 
the action, which shall not be less than five days or more than 20 days 
from the date of service. 
57-16-7. Rules of parks. 
(1) A mobile home park may promulgate rules related to the health, safety, 
and appropriate conduct of residents and to the maintenance and upkeep of 
such park. No change in rule that is unconscionable is valid. No new or 
amended rule shall take effect, nor provide the basis for an eviction notice, 
until the expiration of at least 60 days after its promulgation. Each resident, 
as a condition precedent to such rule being in effect, shall be provided with a 
copy of each new or amended rule that does not appear in their lease agree-
ment. 
(2) A mobile home park may specify the type of material used, and the 
methods used in the installation of, underskirting, awnings, porches, fences, 
or other additions or alterations to the exterior of a mobile home, and may 
also specify the tie-down equipment used in a mobile home space, in order to 
insure the safety and good appearance of the park; but under no circum-
stances may it require a resident to purchase such material or equipment 
from a supplier designated by the mobile home park. 
(3) No mobile home park may charge an entrance fee, exit fee, nor installa-
tion fee, but reasonable landscaping and maintenance requirements may be 
included in* the mobile home park rules. The resident is responsible for all 
costs incident to connection of the mobile home to existing mobile home park 
facilities and for the installation and maintenance of the mobile home on the 
mobile home space. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a mobile home 
park from requiring a reasonable initial security deposit. 
57-16-8. Payment of rent and fees during pendency of 
eviction proceeding. 
If a resident elects to contest an eviction proceeding, all rents, fees, and 
service charges due and incurred during the pendency of the action shall be 
paid into court according to the current mobile home park payment schedule. 
Failure of the resident to pay such amounts may, in the discretion of the court, 
constitute grounds for granting summary judgment in favor of the mobile 
home park. Upon final termination of the issues between the parties, the court 
shall order all amounts paid into court paid to the mobile home park. The 
prevailing party is also entitled to court costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 
57-16-9. Lienholder's liability for rent and fees. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of § 38-3-2 and § 70A-9-317, the lienholder 
of record of a mobile home is primarily liable to the mobile home park owner 
or operator for rent and service charges if a mobile home is not removed 
within 10 days after receipt of written notice that a mobile home has been 
abandoned or that a writ of restitution has been issued. The lienholder, how-
ever, is only liable for rent that accrues after receipt of such notice. 
wm *r ** uti l i ty service to mobile home parks —• Limita-
tion on providers1 charges. 
Local water, sewer, and sanitation entities, including those administered by 
municipalities and counties which provide water, sewer, or garbage collection 
services shall not receive a greater percentage net return from supplying a 
mobile home park than said entity receives from other residential customers. 
The net return is determined by taking into consideration the costs of mainte-
nance and depreciation of the mobile home park facilities and all savings on 
administrative costs, including cost of billing residents. 
R i g h t s a n d ii'im d i e s n o t e x c l u s i v e , 
The rights and remedies gnuiled by this chapter are cumulative and not 
exclusive. 
57 16-12. Waiver of rights a ncl duties prohibited. 
No pa rk or resident may agree to waive any r ight, duty, or privilege con-
fei i sd by this chapter. 
5 J 18 -15 1 Eviction proceeding. 
(1) Eviction proceedings commenced under this chapter and based on 
causes of action set forth in Subsections 57-16-5(1), (2), and (5), and eviction 
proceedings commenced under this chapter based on causes of action set forth 
in Subsections 57-16-5(3) and (4), where a landlord elects to bring an action 
under this chapter and not under the unlawful detainer provisions of Chapter 
36, Title 78, shall provide for the following: 
(a) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon delaul* >i  
judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff may include an order of restitu-
tion of the premises. The judgment may also declare the forfeiture of tho 
lease or agreement. 
(b) The jury or the court, if the proceedings are tried without a jury or 
upon the defendant's default, shall also assess the damages resulting to 
the plaintiff from any of the following: 
(i) waste of the premises during the resident's tenancy ill ivnslf i". 
alleged in the complaint and proved; and 
(ii) the amount of rent due. 
(c) 'The judgment shall also provide for reasonable attorneys1" fees if 
they are provided for in the lease or agreement. 
(d) If the proceeding is contested, the prevailing party is entitled to 
court costs and attorneys' fees, regardless of whether the lease agreement 
provides for the same. 
CHAPTER 
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER 
78 36 1 "Foi cible enti y" deli, 
E u ery person, is guilty of a forcible e^i*. -: 
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or . house, or by 
fraud, intimidation or stealth, or by any kind of violence or circumstances 
of terror, enters upon or into any real property; or, 
(2) after entering peaceably upon real property, turns out by force, 
threats or menacing conduct the party in actual possession. 
78-36-2, " I : dMe detainer" defined. 
Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer who eithei : 
(1) by force, or by menaces and threats of violence, unlawfully holds 
and keeps the possession of any real property, whether the same was 
acquired peaceably or otherwise; or, 
(2) in the nighttime, or during the absence of the oc ciij; >J int : of anj i eal 
property, unlawfully enters thereon, and, after demand made for the sur-
render thereof, refuses for the period of three days to surrender the same 
to such former occupant. The occupant of real property within the mean-
ing of this subdivision is one who within five days preceding such unlaw-
ful entry was in the peaceable and undisturbed possession of such lands. 
78-36-3. Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than 
life. 
(1) k tenant of real property, for a term less fhor" i,f ran unlaw-
ful detainer: 
(a) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the 
property or any part of it, after the expiration of the specified term or 
period for which it is let to him, which specified term or period, whether 
established by express or implied contract, or whether written or parol, 
shall be terminated without notice at the expiration of the specified term 
or period; 
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite time w ith 
monthly or other periodic rent reserved: 
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant after 
the end of any month or period, in cases where the owner, his desig-
nated agent, or any successor in estate of the owner, 15 days or more 
prior to the end of that month or period, has served notice requiring 
him to quit the premises at the expiration of that month or period; or 
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in possession of 
the premises after the expiration of a notice of not less than five days; 
(c) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after 
default in the payment of any rent and after a notice in writing requiring 
in the alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the de-
tained premises, has remained uncomplied with for a period of three days 
after service, which notice may be served at any time after the rent 
becomes due; 
ADDENDUM "G" 
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased premises contrary to the 
covenants of the lease, or commits or permits waste on the premises, or 
when he sets up or carries on any unlawful business on or in the premises, 
or when he suffers, permits, or maintains on or about the premises any 
nuisance, including nuisance as defined in Section 78-38-9, and remains 
in possession after service upon him of a three days* notice to quit; or 
(e) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after a 
neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or 
agreement under which the property is held, other than those previously 
mentioned, and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the 
performance of the conditions or covenant or the surrender of the prop-
erty, served upon him and upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the 
premises remains uncomplied with for three days after service. Within 
three days after the service of the notice, the tenant, any subtenant in 
actual occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of the term, or other 
person interested in its continuance may perform the condition or cove-
nant and thereby save the lease from forfeiture, except that if the cove-
nants and conditions of the lease violated by the lessee cannot afterwards 
be performed, then no notice need be given. 
(2) Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a mobile home is determined 
under Title 57, Chapter 16, Mobile Home Park Residency Act. 
(3) The notice provisions for nuisance in Subsection 78-36-3(l)(d) are not 
applicable to nuisance actions provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16 
only. 
78-36-4. Right of tenant of agricultural lands to hold over. 
In all cases of tenancy upon agricultural lands, where the tenant has held 
over and retained possession for more than 60 days after the expiration of his 
term without any demand of possession or notice to quit by the owner, his 
designated agent, or his successor in estate, he shall be deemed to be held by 
permission of the owner, his designated agent, or his successor in estate, and 
shall be entitled to hold under the terms of the lease for another full year, and 
shall not be guilty of an unlawful detainer during that year; and the holding 
over for the 60-day period shall be taken and construed as a consent on the 
part of the tenant to hold for another year. 
78-36-5. Remedies available to tenant against 
undertenant. 
A tenant may take proceedings similar to those prescribed in this chapter to 
obtain possession of the premises let to an undertenant in case of his unlawful 
detention of the premises underlet to him. 
78-36-6. Nntirr to quit How senvml 
The notices required by the preceding sections may be served: 
(1) by delivering a copy to the tenant personally; 
(2) by sending a copy through registered or certified mail addressed to 
the tenant at his place of residence; 
(3) if he is absent from his place of residence ,
 tCkl 
business, by leaving a copy with a person of suiur i*e a-:n ;iscrei. 
either place and mailing a copy to the tenant at the address oi his place of 
residence or place of business; or 
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found at the place 
of residence, then by affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the leased 
property, Service upon a subtenant may be made in the same manner. 
78-36-7. 1Jecessary parties defend a. *; 
(1) No person other than, the tenant of the premisr 
is one in the actual occupation of the premises who? •
 f 
shall be made a party defendant in the proceeding, except as provided in 
Section 78-38-13, nor shall any proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be non-
suited, for the nonjoinder of any person who might have been made a party 
defendant; but when it appears that any of the parties served with process or 
appearing in the proceedings are guilty, judgment shall be rendered against 
those parties. 
(2) If a person has become subtenant of the premises in conti o \ ers) af tei 
the service of any notice as provided in this chapter, the fact that such notice 
was not served on the subtenant is not a defense to the action. All persons who 
enter under the tenant after the commencement of the action shall be bound 
by the judgment the same as if they had been made parties to the action. 
(3) A landlord, owner, or designated agent is a necessary party defendant 
only in an abatement by eviction action for an unlawful drug house as pro-
vided in Section 78-38-13. 
78-36-8- Allegations permitted in complaint — Time Ior 
appearance — Service of summons. 
The plaintiff in his complaint, in addition to setting « 2 ^ / ^ ^ r 
he seeks to recover, may set forth any circumstances of fraud, force, or 
teiS^A^S^S accompanied the alleged forcible entry, or forcible or 
unlaLwft?£5Sr?i id claim damages therefor or compensation for the occu-
paUon of the premises, or both If the unlawful < ^ ™ ^ ^ 
default in the payment of rent, the complaint shall state the amount ot rent 
d S TOa c ^ S S f i n d « on the summons the number of days within which 
the defendant is required to appear and defend the ^^l^f^0^ 
less than three or more than 20 days from the ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
authorize service by publication or mail for cause shown. Service by public* 
SonTc?mplete one7 week after publication. Service by mail is complete three 
days after mailing. The summons shall be changed in form to conform to the 
time of service as ordered, and,, shall, be served, as in other cases. 
78-36-8.5. Possession bond of plaintiff — Alternative reme-
dies. 
(1) At any time between the filing of his complaint and the entry of final 
judgment, the plaintiff may execute and file a possession bond. The bond may 
be in the form of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds, or a property 
bond executed by two persons who own real property in the state and who are 
not parties to the action. The court shall approve the bond in an amount that 
is the probable amount of costs of suit and damages which may result to the 
defendant if the suit has been improperly instituted. The bond shall be pay-
able to the clerk of the court for the benefit of the defendant for all costs and 
damages actually adjudged against the plaintiff. The plaintiff shall notify the 
defendant that he has filed a possession bond. This notice shall be served in 
the same manner as service of summons and shall inform the defendant of all 
of the alternative remedies and procedures under Subsection (2). 
(2) The following are alternative remedies and procedures applicable to an 
action if the plaintiff files a possession bond under Subsection (1): 
(a) With respect to an unlawful detainer action based solely upon non-
payment of rent or utilities, the existing contract shall remain in force 
and the complaint shall be dismissed if the defendant, within three days 
of the service of the notice of the possession bond, pays accrued rent, 
utility charges, any late fee, and other costs, including attorney's fees, as 
provided in the rental agreement. 
(b) The defendant may remain in possession if he executes and files a 
counter bond in the form of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds, 
or a property bond executed by two persons who own real property in the 
state and who are not parties to the action. The form of the bond is at the 
defendant's option. The bond shall be payable to the clerk of the court. 
The defendant shall file the bond prior to the expiration of three days 
from the date he is served with notice of the filing of plaintiffs possession 
bond. The court shall approve the bond in an amount that is the probable 
amount of costs of suit and actual damages that may result to the plaintiff 
if the defendant has improperly withheld possession. The court shall con-
sider prepaid rent to the owner as a portion of the defendant's total bond. 
(c) The defendant, upon demand, shall be granted a hearing to be held 
prior to the expiration of three days from the date the defendant is served 
with notice of the filing of plaintiffs possession bond. 
(3) If the defendant does not elect and comply with a remedy under Subsec-
tion (2) within the required time, the plaintiff, upon ex parte motion, shall be 
granted an order of restitution. The constable of the precinct or the sheriff of 
the county where the property is situated shall return possession of the prop-
erty to the plaintiff promptly. 
(4) If the defendant demands a hearing under Subsection (2)(c), and if the 
court rules after the hearing that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the 
property, the constable or sheriff shall promptly return possession of the prop-
erty to the plaintiff. If at the hearing the court allows the defendant to remain 
in possession and further issues remain to be adjudicated between the parties, 
the court shall require the defendant to post a bond as required in Subsection 
(2Kb). If at the hearing the court rules that all issues between the parties can 
be adjudicated without further court proceedings, the court shall, upon abjudi-
cating those issues, enter judgment on the merits. 
78-36-9. Proof required by plaintiff — Defense. 
On the trial of any proceeding for any forcible entry or forcible detainer the 
plaintiff shall only be required to show, in addition to the forcible entry or 
forcible detainer complained of, that he was peaceably in the actual possession 
at the time of the forcible entry, or was entitled to the possession at the time of 
the forcible detainer. The defendant may show in his defense that he or his 
ancestors, or those whose interest in such premises he claims, had been in the 
quiet possession thereof for the space of one whole year continuously next 
before the commencement of the proceedings, and that his interest therein is 
not then ended or determined; and such showing is a bar to the proceedings. 
78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent 
Immediate enforcement — Treble damages. 
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon default. A judg-
ment entered in favor of the plaintifT shall include an order for the restitution 
of the premises. If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after neglect or 
failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under 
which the property is held, or after default in the payment of rent, the judg-
ment shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease or agreement. 
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon 
the defendant's default, shall also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff 
from any of the following: 
(a) forcible entry; 
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; 
(c) waste of the premises during the v mi \\ I w^iv is 
alleged in the complaint and proved at t 
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unu vtui detainer is after 
default in the payment of rent; and 
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction as provided in Sections 
78-38-9 through 78-38-16 
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for 
three times the amount of the damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a) 
through (2)(c), and for reasonable attorney's fees, if they are provided for in 
the lease or agreement. 
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default in the payment of 
the rent, execution upon the judgment shall be issued immediately after the 
(IRINMII III (ill cimm, the judgment may be issued and enforced 
78-36-11- Time for appeal. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), either party may, within ten days, 
appeal from the judgment rendered. 
(2) In a nuisance action under Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16, an) pai tj 
may appeal from, the judgment rendered within, three clays 
78-36-12. Exclusion of tenant without judicial process pro-
hibited — Abandoned premises excepted. 
It is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a tenant from the tenant's 
premises in any manner except by judicial process, provided, an owner or his 
agent shall not be prevented from removing the contents of the leased prem-
ises under Subsection 78-36-12.6(2) and retaking the premises and attempting 
to rent them at a fair rental value when the tenant has abandoned the prem-
ises. 
78-36-12.3. Definitions. 
(1) "Willful exclusion" means preventing the tenant from entering into the 
premises with intent to deprive the tenant of such entry. 
(2) "Owner" means the actual owner of the premises and shall also have the 
same meaning as landlord under common law and the statutes of this state. 
(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of the following situations: 
(a) The tenant has not notified the owner that he or she will be absent 
from the premises, and the tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days after 
the due date, and there is no reasonable evidence other than the presence 
of the tenants personal property that the tenant is occupying the prem-
ises; or 
(b) The tenant has not notified the owner that he or she will be absent 
from the premises, and the tenant fails to pay rent when due and the 
tenant's personal property has been removed from the dwelling unit and 
there is no reasonable evidence that the tenant is occupying the premises. 
78-36-12.6. Abandoned premises — Retaking and 
rerenting by owner — Liability of tenant — Per-
sonal property of tenant left on premises. 
(1) In the event of abandonment the owner may retake the premises and 
attempt to rent them at a fair rental value and the tenant who abandoned the 
premises shall be liable: 
(a) for the entire rent due for the remainder of the term; or 
(b) for rent accrued during the period necessary to re-rent the premises 
at a fair rental value, plus the difference between the fair rental value 
and the rent agreed to in the prior rental agreement, plus a reasonable 
commission for the renting of the premises and the costs, if any, necessary 
to restore the rental unit to its condition when rented by the tenant less 
normal wear and tear. This subsection applies, if less than Subsection (a) 
notwithstanding that the owner did not re-rent the premises. 
(2) If the tenant has abandoned the premises and has left personal property 
on the premises, the owner is entitled to remove the property from the dwell-
ing, store it for the tenant, and recover actual moving and storage costs from 
the tenant. The owner shall make reasonable efforts to notify the tenant of the 
location of the personal property; however, if the property has been in storage 
for over 30 days and the tenant has made no reasonable effort to recover it, 
the owner may sell the property and apply the proceeds toward any amount 
the tenant owes. Any money left over from the sale of the property shall be 
handled as specified in Section 78-44-18. Nothing contained in this act shall 
be in derogation of or alter the owner's rights under Title 38, Chapter 3. 
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Amend ment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment renumbered this rule, formerly Rule 
4-405; added the phrase beginning "and to" un-
der Applicability"; added "Upon initial appli-
cation, and thereafter" to the beginning of Sub-
division (1); in Subdivision (1)(C), inserted the 
subdivision designation (i) and added Subdivi-
sions (ii) through (vii); redesignated former 
Subdivision (1)(D) as Subdivision (D(CXxiii); 
redesignated former Subdivision (IKE) as Sub-
division <1)(D); redesignated former Subdivi-
sions (IMF) through (J) as Subdivisions 
(IHCHviii) through (xii) and in Subdivision 
iviii) substituted "existing in Utah or any 
other state" for uin any court of the state"; 
added Subdivisions (2XA) through (C), (3), (4), 
and iSKA) and the first two sentences in Subdi-
vision (5KB), making former Subdivision (3) 
the third sentence in present Subdivision 
5)(B)\ deleted former Subdivision (4), provid-
ing for full faith and credit among courts for 
orders qualifying sureties; redesignated former 
Subdivisions (5) through (7) as Subdivisions 
(5)(C) and (D) and (6); substituted "circuit" for 
"court" in Subdivision l5KC); substituted "pre-
siding judge" for "court" in two places in Subdi-
vision (5KD); substituted "March 1st" for "Feb-
ruary 28th" in Subdivision (6); added Subdivi-
sion (7); and made stylistic changes through-
out 
The 1!)91 amendment KI Subdivision ll) 
jddod "or if the statement is made on behalf of 
a business or corporation, a statement that the 
business or corporation" to the introductory 
language of paragraph (C) and made stylistic 
changes; rewrote Subdivision (2) to delete lan-
guage relating to appraisals and inserted "pre-
pared by a certified public accountant"; redes-
ignated former Subdivision (2)(C) as present 
Sn ibdivision (3), added p resen t Subdivis ion (4) t 
and renumbered the remaining subdivisions 
accord i ngly, mak i ng appropria te ref ere nee 
changes throughout; in present Subdivision 
(3), deleted "audited" before "financial state-
ment" and substituted "surety" for "company" 
in the first sentence and substituted "the 
value" for "a ratio of bond dollars to letter of 
credit dollars" in the second sentence; in 
present Subdivision (5), substituted "current 
assets" for "real assets" in two places; and re-
wrote present Subdivision (6) to delete a table 
setting out the ratio of bond dollars outstand-
ing to net worth value. 
The 1992 amendment substituted "Commer-
cial" for "qualifications of in the rule heading, 
inserted "re-qualification and disqualification" 
and "commercial" in the Intent section, and 
substantially rewrote the rule. 
The 1993 amendment, effective February 1, 
1993, in Subdivision (6) added the designation 
(A), deleted "the lesser of $500,000 or" after 
"exceed" in Subdivision (A), and added Subdi-
vision (B), 
Rule 
Intent: 
2fw oeations of trial courts <*! ocord. 
To designate locations of trial courts of record. 
* i w . r » u ; i ; 
Tins rule shall nprilv *-^ all trial courts of record. 
Statement of the Ruie 
11) Each . --UI.LV seat and the following municipalities are hereby desig-
nated a^ locations of trial courts of record: American Fork; Bountiful; O d a r 
1
 *ity; Clearfield; Kaysville; Layton; Murray; Orem; Park City; Roosevelt; :- . , \ \ 
Salem; Sandy; Spanish Fork; West Valley City. 
<2) Subject to limitations imposed by law, a trial court of record A ^n\ 
subject matter jurisdiction may hold court in any location designated by this 
rule. 
'Added effective J anua ry 1, 1992.) 
ARTICLE 5. 
CIVIL PRACTICE. 
Kale 4-oOL Motions. 
ntent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda 
artd documents with the court. 
ADDENDUM " I " 
Rule 4-501 CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 858 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on 
dispositive motions 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district and circuit courts 
except proceedings before the court commissioners and the small claims de-
partment of the circuit court This rule does not apply to petitions for habeas 
corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda. 
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncon-
tested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of 
points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by 
page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other docu-
ments relied upon in support of the motion Memoranda supporting or 
opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the 
"statement of material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as 
waived by order of the court on ex-parte application If an ex-parte appli-
cation is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall 
state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is 
in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a summary of the 
memorandum, not to exceed five pages 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party 
shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a 
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting 
documentation If the responding party fails to file a memorandum m 
opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the 
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for 
decision as provided in paragraph (l)(d) of this rule 
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply 
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's 
memorandum 
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day 
period to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk to 
submit the matter to the court for decision The notification shall be in 
the form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit 
for Decision " The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all 
parties If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for 
decision 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authori-
ties in support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which 
movant contends no genuine issue exists The facts shall be stated in 
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions 
of the record upon which the movant relies 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and author-
ities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the 
party contends a genuine issue exists Each disputed fact shall be stated 
in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those por-
tions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applica-
ble, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts 
that are disputed All material facts set forth in the movant's statement 
and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be 
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deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment u t i l e s -p-vr".. 
caliy controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
i.)> H e a r i n g s . 
;
.-u A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless 
,rdered by the Court, or requested by the parties as provided in para-
graphs (3Mb) or (4) below. 
h' In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action 
<uiy issues in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at 
itie t ime of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition 
to a motion may file a written request for a hearing. 
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court fincL mu ;u> 
m o t i o n or oppos i t ion to t h e m o t i o n is f r ivolous or (b) t h a t t h e di. .><>>.. ive 
issue or set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion *\i 
been authoritatively decided. 
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the 
requesting party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall 
set the mat ter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter 
shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for 
hearing and notify all parties of the date and time. 
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the 
motion, memorandum of points and authorities and all documents sup-
porting or opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the 
mat ter a t least two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies 
shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time 
of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the 
court. 
(0 If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the pai . . i -
file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed 
waived. 
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty i30) days be-
fore the scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall bv heard ar - • 
that date without leave of the Court. 
(4) E x p e d i t e d d ispos i t ions . Upon motion and notice and for good cause 
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any c-sr 
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule 
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal 
issues and could be resolved summarily. 
(5) Te lephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's 
request may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without 
court appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments 
and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, i ^ i 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . - The 1990 amend-
ment rewrote this rule to such an extent that a 
detailed description is impracticable. 
The 1991 amendment deleted "and a copy of 
ANALYSIS 
When • "=IM 6. 
Cited. 
When rule app l i e s . 
Because the defendants' Rule 56(e) objection 
to the plaintiffs first affidavit was framed as a 
separate, written motion to strike, the plaintiff 
the proposed order" following supporting doc-
umentation" in Subdivision (1Kb) and made re-
lated stylistic changes and inserted "principal" 
in Subdivision (3)(b). 
should have been given ten days to respond, as 
prescribed by Subdivision (1Mb) of this rule. 
Gillmor v. Cummings, 806 P.2d 1205 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). 
Cited in Huston v. Lewis. 818 P.2d 531 
(Utah 1991); Lucero v. Warden of Utah State 
Prison, 841 P.2d 1230 <l 'tan Ct. App. 1992). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
